



**DrupalCon**  
SEATTLE 2019  
APRIL 8-12

# Coordinated disclosure, cross-project collaboration, and Drupal 8 security

xjm | @xjmdrupal



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**No photos please**





*"Statue" of me, from yched*

## I'm xjm

- Drupal 8 release manager
- Drupal Security Team member
- Code & Community Strategist, Acquia

 [drupal.org/u/xjm](https://drupal.org/u/xjm)

 @xjm Drupal



# What is coordinated disclosure?

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"...A vulnerability is disclosed only after a period of time that allows for the vulnerability to be patched."


--Wikipedia



# Modern tooling



# Semantic versioning, 6-month release cycle



# Drupal 8 coordinates releases with...

- Drupal 7
- Contributed projects
- Upstream dependencies
- Other OS projects (Backdrop, WordPress...)





# Security release challenges and successes

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(As illustrated by past Drupal 8  
security advisories)



# httpoxy & Guzzle



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SA-CORE-2016-003  
Drupal 8.1.7, July 2016

<https://httpoxy.org/>

# httproxy & Guzzle

Fixed in Guzzle 6.2.1


```
- if ($proxy = getenv('HTTP_PROXY')) {  
-   $defaults['proxy']['http'] = $proxy;  
+ if (php_sapi_name() == 'cli' && getenv('HTTP_PROXY')) {  
+   $defaults['proxy']['http'] = getenv('HTTP_PROXY');
```

<https://httproxy.org/>



# htpoxxy & Guzzle

Fixed in Guzzle 6.2.1



# httplib & Guzzle

Fixed in Guzzle 6.2.1





# PHPUnit remote code execution



↑  
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SA-CORE-2017-001  
Drupal 8.2.7, March 2017  
(packaging change December 2016)

# PHPUnit remote code execution

Drupal.org packaging change

Drupal™

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## Drupal 8 will no longer include dev dependencies in release packages

Posted by [xjm](#) on *12 November 2016*

As a best practice, development tools should not be deployed on production sites. Accordingly, packaged Drupal 8 stable releases will no longer contain [development PHP libraries](#), because



# PHPUnit remote code execution

Fixed in PHPUnit 4.8.28

```
<?php
```

```
- eval('?'>' . file_get_contents('php://input'));  
+ eval('?'>' . file_get_contents('php://stdin'));
```

# PHPUnit remote code execution

## CLI functionality

```
<?php
```

```
- eval('?' . file_get_contents('php://input'));  
+ eval('?' . file_get_contents('php://stdin'));
```


*Compare:*

```
- if ($proxy = getenv('HTTP_PROXY')) {  
-   $defaults['proxy']['http'] = $proxy;  
+ if (php_sapi_name() == 'cli' && getenv('HTTP_PROXY')) {  
+   $defaults['proxy']['http'] = getenv('HTTP_PROXY');
```



# PHPUnit remote code execution

Fixed in PHPUnit 4.8.28



# jQuery 2 Ajax XSS




**13**

No Drupal 8 SA  
Drupal 8.4.0, October 2017  
(D7 mitigation in SA-CORE-2018-001)



# jQuery 2 Ajax XSS



# CKEditor stored XSS (img alt attribute)



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SA-CORE-2018-003  
Drupal 8.5.2, April 2018

*(Thank you mlewand and wwalc!)*



# REST entity vulnerability #1: Entity access bypass



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SA-CORE-2017-002  
Drupal 8.3.1 and 8.2.8, April 2017

<http://bit.ly/sam-2017-002>



# REST entity vulnerability #1: Entity access bypass

```
+ if ($operation === 'edit') {  
+   if ($field_definition->getName() === $this->entityType->getKey('id')) {  
+     return $return_as_object  
+       ? AccessResult::forbidden('The entity ID cannot be changed')  
+       : FALSE;  
+   }  
+   elseif ($field_definition->getName() ===  
+     $this->entityType->getKey('uuid')) {  
+     if ($items && ($entity = $items->getEntity()) && !$entity->isNew()) {  
+       return $return_as_object  
+         ? AccessResult::forbidden('The entity UUID cannot be changed')  
+         ->addCacheableDependency($entity)  
+         : FALSE;  
+     }  
+   }  
+ }  
+ }
```



# REST entity vulnerability #1: Entity access bypass

**Drupal 8.2**

**Nodes vulnerable**

<http://bit.ly/sam-2017-002>

# REST entity vulnerability #1: Entity access bypass

**Drupal 8.2**

**Nodes vulnerable**

**Drupal 8.3**

**Users vulnerable**

<http://bit.ly/sam-2017-002>



# REST entity vulnerability #2: Missing file validation




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SA-CORE-2017-003  
Drupal 8.3.4, June 2017

*\*Note: Score shown here differs from the published SA*

# REST entity vulnerability #2: Missing file validation





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## REST entity vulnerability #2: Missing file validation

```
+ $create_only_fields = [  
+   'uri',  
+   'filemime',  
+   'filesize',  
+ ];  
+ $field_name = $field_definition->getName();  
+ if ($operation === 'edit' && $items && ($entity = $items->getEntity())  
+   && !$entity->isNew()  
+   && in_array($field_name, $create_only_fields, TRUE)) {  
+   return AccessResult::forbidden();  
+ }
```



# REST entity vulnerability #3: Comment approval bypass



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SA-CORE-2017-004  
Drupal 8.3.7, August 2017

## REST entity vulnerability #3: Comment approval bypass

```
if (is_null($this->get('status')->value)) {  
    if (\Drupal::currentUser()->hasPermission('skip comment approval')) {  
        $this->setPublished();  
    }  
}
```

```
▶ 1 2 3 _restSubmittedFields = {array} [5]  
▶ 1 2 3 cid = {array} [1]  
▶ 1 2 3 uuid = {array} [1]  
▶ 1 2 3 langcode = {array} [1]  
▶ 1 2 3 comment_type = {array} [1]  
▼ 1 2 3 status = {array} [1]  
  ▼ 1 2 3 x-default = {array} [1]  
    ▼ 1 2 3 0 = {array} [1]  
      10 01 value = true  
▶ 1 2 3 pid = {array} [1]
```

(image credit: arshadcn)



# REST entity vulnerability #3: Comment approval bypass

```
parent::preSave($storage);  
- if (is_null($this->get('status')->value)) {  
-   if (\Drupal::currentUser()->hasPermission('skip comment approval')) {  
-     $this->setPublished();  
-   }  
-   else {  
-     $this->setUnpublished();  
-   }  
- }  
+ $fields['status']->setDefaultValueCallback(  
+   'Drupal\comment\Entity\Comment::getDefaultStatus'  
+ );  
  
+ public static function getDefaultStatus() {  
+   return \Drupal::currentUser()->hasPermission('skip comment approval')  
+     ? CommentInterface::PUBLISHED  
+     : CommentInterface::NOT_PUBLISHED;  
+ }
```



# REST entity vulnerability #4: Remote code execution



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"Potatobug"  
SA-CORE-2019-003  
Drupal 8.6.10 and 8.5.11, February 2019



## REST entity vulnerability #4: Remote code execution

```
+ $this->checkForSerializedStrings($data, $class, $field_item);  
  
if (is_string($values['options'])) {  
-   $values['options'] = unserialize($values['options']);  
+   if (version_compare(PHP_VERSION, '7.0.0', '>=')) {  
+       $values['options'] =  
+           unserialize($values['options'], ['allowed_classes' => FALSE]);  
+   }  
+   else {  
+       $values['options'] = unserialize($values['options']);  
+   }  
}
```

<https://paper.seebug.org/821/>  
<https://www.ambionics.io/blog/drupal8-rce>

# REST entity vulnerability #4: Remote code execution

## Coordinated releases

### Drupal 8

- JSON:API
- Translation Management Tool
- Paragraphs
- Metatag
- Font Awesome Icons
- Video

### Drupal 7

- RestWS
- RESTful (*released later*)
- Link



# REST entity vulnerability #4: Remote code execution

```
rest.resource.entity.node.yml:
```

```
methods:
```

- GET
- POST
- PATCH
- DELETE

```
formats:
```

- hal\_json

```
authentication:
```

- basic\_auth

<https://paper.seebug.org/821/>  
<https://www.ambionics.io/blog/drupal8-rce>

# REST entity vulnerability #4: Remote code execution

## JSON:API

[Home](#) » [Administration](#) » [Configuration](#) » [Web services](#)

### Allowed operations

- Accept only JSON:API read operations.
- Accept all JSON:API create, read, update, and delete operations.

Warning: Only enable all operations if the site requires it. [Learn more about securing your site with JSON:API.](#)

[Save configuration](#)

[https://www.drupal.org/project/jsonapi\\_extras](https://www.drupal.org/project/jsonapi_extras)



# Lessons learned

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What have we learned?  
How can we improve?



# Effective coordinated disclosure is *hard*



**Wendy Nather**

@wendynather

Follow



OH: Coordinated disclosure is like conducting an orchestra where half the musicians don't show up and the other half are playing a song they never heard before

Also, some musicians deny they're playing instruments. And the woodwinds section is on fire

9:03 AM - 28 Feb 2018

70 Retweets 225 Likes



# We can't always set the schedule

We must avoid single points of failure.  
Cross-project relationships are essential.

# We have to deal with BC breaks in dependency updates

jQuery3 broke stuff.  
Symfony broke more.  
We needed both.



# Dependency release schedules are important

Drupal 8 will be end-of-life in November 2021,  
to avoid another Symfony BC break.

Drupal 9 will be released in 2020 with Symfony 4 (or 5) support.

# We need (secure) automatic updates for security issues

This is not simple to solve.

<https://www.drupal.org/initiatives/automatic-updates>

<http://bit.ly/hacking-wordpress-autoupdate>

# New vulnerabilities and attack vectors

Drupal 8 APIs are new and evolving.  
Vulnerabilities evolve along with them.